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Optimal Relay Selection for Physical-Layer
Security in Cooperative Wireless Networks
Yulong Zou, Xianbin Wang, and Weiming Shen
Abstract—In this paper, we explore the physical-layer security
in cooperative wireless networks with multiple relays where
both amplify-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF)
protocols are considered. We propose the AF and DF based
optimal relay selection (i.e., AFbORS and DFbORS) schemes
to improve the wireless security against eavesdropping attack.
For the purpose of comparison, we examine the traditional
AFbORS and DFbORS schemes, denoted by T-AFbORS and T-
DFbORS, respectively. We also investigate a so-called multiple
relay combining (MRC) framework and present the traditional
AF and DF based MRC schemes, called T-AFbMRC and T-
DFbMRC, where multiple relays participate in forwarding the
source signal to destination which then combines its received
signals from the multiple relays. We derive closed-form intercept
probability expressions of the proposed AFbORS and DFbORS
(i.e., P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS) as well as the T-AFbORS, T-
DFbORS, T-AFbMRC and T-DFbMRC schemes in the presence
of eavesdropping attack. We further conduct an asymptotic
intercept probability analysis to evaluate the diversity order
performance of relay selection schemes and show that no matter
which relaying protocol is considered (i.e., AF and DF), the
traditional and proposed optimal relay selection approaches both
achieve the diversity order M where M represents the number
of relays. In addition, numerical results show that for both
AF and DF protocols, the intercept probability performance of
proposed optimal relay selection is strictly better than that of the
traditional relay selection and multiple relay combining methods.
Index Terms—Relay selection, physical-layer security, intercept
probability, diversity order, cooperative wireless networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
MULTIPLE-INPUT multiple-output (MIMO) [1], [2] hasbeen widely recognized as an effective way to combat
wireless fading and increase link throughput by exploiting
multiple antennas at both the transmitter and receiver. How-
ever, it may be difficult to implement multiple antennas in
some cases (e.g., handheld terminals, sensor nodes, etc.) due
to the limitation in physical size and power consumption.
As an alternative, user cooperation [3] is now emerging as
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a promising paradigm to achieve the spatial diversity by
enabling user terminals to share their antennas and form a
virtual antenna array. Until recently, there has been extensive
research on the user cooperation from different perspectives,
e.g., cooperative resource allocation [4], performance analysis
and optimization [5], [6], and cooperative medium access
control (MAC) and routing design [7], [8].
User cooperation not only improves the reliability and
throughput of wireless transmissions, but also has great po-
tential to enhance the wireless security against eavesdropping
attack. Differing from the conventional encryption techniques
relying on secret keys, physical-layer security exploits the
physical characteristics of wireless channels to prevent the
eavesdropper from intercepting the signal transmission from
source to its intended destination. It has been proven in [9] and
[10] that in the presence of an eavesdropper, a so-called se-
crecy capacity is shown as the difference between the channel
capacity from source to destination (called main link) and that
from source to eavesdropper (called wiretap link). Moreover, if
the secrecy capacity is negative, the eavesdropper will succeed
in intercepting the source signal and an intercept event occurs
in this case. However, due to the fading effect, the secrecy
capacity is severely limited in wireless communications. To
that end, user cooperation as an emerging spatial diversity
technique can effectively combat wireless fading and thus
improves the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions in the
presence of eavesdropping attack.
At present, most of existing work on the user cooperation
for wireless security is focused on developing the secrecy
capacity from an information-theoretic perspective. In [11], the
authors studied the secrecy capacity of wireless transmissions
in the presence of an eavesdropper with a relay node, where
the amplify-and-forward (AF), decode-and-forward (DF), and
compress-and-forward (CF) relaying protocols are examined
and compared with each other. The cooperative jamming was
proposed in [12] and analyzed in terms of the achievable
secrecy rate, where multiple users are allowed to cooperate
with each other in preventing eavesdropping attack. In [13],
the cooperation strategy was further examined to enhance
the physical-layer security and a so-called noise-forwarding
scheme was proposed, where the relay node attempts to send
codewords independent of the source message to confuse the
eavesdropper. In [14] and [15], the authors studied the cooper-
ative relays for enhancing physical-layer security and showed
the secrecy capacity improvement by using cooperative relays.
The physical-layer security was further examined in two-
way relay networks in [16] and [17] where multiple two-way
relays are exploited to improve the secrecy capacity against
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eavesdropping attack. In addition, the authors of [18] and
[19] investigated the physical-layer security in MIMO relay
networks and showed the significant improvement in terms of
secrecy capacity through the use of MIMO relays.
In this paper, we consider a cooperative wireless network
with multiple relays in the presence of an eavesdropper and
examine the optimal relay selection to improve physical-layer
security against eavesdropping attack. Differing from the tradi-
tional relay selection in [20]-[22] where only the channel state
information (CSI) of two-hop relay links (i.e., source-relay and
relay-destination) are considered, we here have to take into
account additional CSI of the wiretap links, in addition to the
two-hop relay links’ CSI. The main contributions of this paper
are summarized as follows. Firstly, considering AF and DF
relaying protocols, we propose the AF and DF based optimal
relay selection schemes which are denoted by P-AFbORS and
P-DFbORS, respectively. We also examine the traditional AF
and DF based optimal relay selection (i.e., T-AFbORS and
T-DFbORS) and multiple relay combining (i.e., T-AFbMRC
and T-DFbMRC) as benchmark schemes. Secondly, we de-
rive closed-form expressions of intercept probability for the
P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS as well as the T-AFbORS, T-
DFbORS, T-AFbMRC and T-DFbMRC schemes in Rayleigh
fading channels. It is shown that for both AF and DF protocols,
the intercept probability of proposed optimal relay selection
is always smaller than that of the traditional relay selection
and multiple relay combining approaches, which shows the
advantage of proposed optimal relay selection. Finally, we
evaluate the diversity order performance of optimal relay
selection schemes and show that no matter which relaying
protocol is considered, the proposed and traditional optimal
relay selection schemes both achieve the same diversity order
M , where M represents the number of relays.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the system model and proposes the conventional
direct transmission, T-AFbORS, T-DFbORS, T-AFbMRC, T-
DFbMRC, P-AFbORS, and P-DFbORS schemes. In Section
III, we derive closed-form intercept probability expressions of
the direct transmission, T-AFbORS, T-DFbORS, T-AFbMRC,
T-DFbMRC, P-AFbORS, and P-DFbORS schemes in the pres-
ence of eavesdropping attack. In Section IV, we analyze the
diversity order performance of the traditional and proposed re-
lay selection schemes. Next, in Section V, numerical evaluation
is conducted to show the advantage of proposed optimal relay
selection over traditional relay selection and multiple relay
combining approaches in terms of the intercept probability.
Finally, we make some concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROPOSED OPTIMAL RELAY
SELECTION SCHEMES
A. System Model
Consider a cooperative wireless network consisting of one
source, one destination, and M relays in the presence of an
eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1, where all nodes are equipped
with single antenna and the solid and dash lines represent the
main and wiretap links, respectively. The main and wiretap
links both are modeled as Rayleigh fading channels and the
destination
RM
R2
R1
S D
source
eavesdropper
E
 . . .
relays
Fig. 1. A cooperative wireless network consisting of one source, one
destination, and multiple relays in the presence of an eavesdropper.
thermal noise received at any node is modeled as a complex
Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance σ2n,
i.e., CN (0, σ2n). Following [14], we consider that M relays are
exploited to assist the transmission from source to destination
and the direct links from source to destination and eavesdrop-
per are not available, e.g., the destination and eavesdropper
both are out of the coverage area. For notational convenience,
M relays are denoted by R = {Ri|i = 1, 2, · · · ,M}.
Differing from the existing work [14] in which all relays
participate in forwarding the source messages to destination,
we here consider the use of the optimal relay only to assist
the message transmission from source to destination. More
specifically, the source node first broadcasts the message to
cooperative relays among which only the best relay will
be selected to forward its received signal to destination by
using either amplify-and-forward (AF) or decode-and-forward
(DF) strategies. Meanwhile, the eavesdropper monitors the
transmission from the optimal relay to destination and attempts
to interpret the source message. Following [11] and [14],
we assume that the eavesdropper knows everything about
the signal transmission from source via relay to destination,
including the encoding scheme at source, forwarding protocol
at relays, and decoding method at destination, except that the
source signal is confidential.
It is pointed out that in order to effectively prevent the
eavesdropper from intercepting, the optimal relay selection not
only has to consider the CSI of main links to maximize the
channel capacity from source to destination, but also needs
to take into account the wiretap links’ CSI to minimize the
channel capacity from source to eavesdropper. This differs
from the traditional relay selection in [20]-[22] where only
the two-hop relay links’ CSI is considered in performing the
best relay selection. Similarly to [14] and [23], we here assume
that the global CSI of both main and wiretap links is available,
which is a common assumption in the physical-layer security
literature. Notice that the wiretaps link’s CSI can be estimated
and obtained by monitoring the eavesdropper’s transmissions
as discussed in [23]. Moreover, if the eavesdropper’s CSI
is unknown, we can consider the use of traditional relay
selection [20]-[22] which does not require the CSI of wiretap
links. In the following, we first present the conventional direct
transmission without relay as a benchmark scheme and then
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propose the AF and DF based optimal relay selection schemes
to improve the physical-layer security against eavesdropping
attack.
B. Direct Transmission
For comparison purpose, this subsection describes the con-
ventional direct transmission without relay. Consider that the
source transmits a signal s (E(|s|2) = 1) with power P . Thus,
the received signal at destination is expressed as
rd =
√
Phsds+ nd, (1)
where hsd represents a fading coefficient of the channel from
source to destination and nd ∼ CN (0, σ2n) represents additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at destination. Notice that
the channel coefficient hsd is modeled as Rayleigh fading
which corresponds to an ideal OFDM subchannel [24] and
[25]. Meanwhile, due to the broadcast nature of wireless
transmissions, the eavesdropper also receives a copy of the
source signal s and the corresponding received signal is written
as
re =
√
Phses+ ne, (2)
where hse represents a fading coefficient of the channel
from source to eavesdropper and ne ∼ CN (0, σ2n) represents
AWGN at eavesdropper. Assuming the optimal Gaussian code-
book used at source, the maximal achievable rate (also known
as channel capacity) of the direct transmission from source to
destination is obtained from Eq. (1) as
Cdirectsd = log2(1 +
|hsd|2P
σ2n
), (3)
where σ2n is the noise variance. Similarly, from Eq. (2), the
capacity of wiretap link from source to eavesdropper is easily
given by
Cdirectse = log2(1 +
|hse|2P
σ2n
). (4)
It has been proven in [10] that the secrecy capacity is shown
as the difference between the capacity of main link and that of
wiretap link. Hence, the secrecy capacity of direct transmission
is given by
Cdirects = C
direct
sd − Cdirectse , (5)
where Cdirectsd and Cdirectse are given in Eqs. (3) and (4), re-
spectively. As discussed in [10], when the secrecy capacity is
negative (i.e., the capacity of main link falls below the wiretap
link’s capacity), the eavesdropper will succeed in intercept-
ing the source signal and an intercept event occurs. Thus,
the probability that the eavesdropper successfully intercepts
source signal, called intercept probability, is a key metric in
evaluating the performance of physical-layer security. In this
paper, we mainly focus on how to improve the intercept prob-
ability by exploiting cooperative relays for the physical-layer
security enhancement. The following subsections propose the
optimal relay selection by considering AF and DF protocols,
respectively.
C. Amplify-and-Forward
In this subsection, we consider the AF relaying protocol in
which the relay will forward a scaled version of its received
source signal to destination without any sort of decoding. To
be specific, the source node first broadcasts the signal s to
M relays. Then, the optimal relay node will be selected to
transmit a scaled version of its received signal. Notice that in
the AF relaying process, the source signal s is transmitted
twice from the source and relay. In order to make a fair
comparison with the direct transmission, the total amount of
transmit power at source and relay shall be limited to P . By
using the equal-power allocation for simplicity, the transmit
power at source and relay is given by P/2. Thus, considering
that the source node transmits its signal s with power P/2,
the received signal at relay Ri can be given by
ri =
√
P
2
hsis+ ni, (6)
where hsi represents a fading coefficient of the channel from
source to Ri and ni ∼ CN (0, σ2n) represents AWGN at Ri.
Without loss of generality, consider that Ri is selected as the
optimal relay to forward its received signal to destination.
Assuming that the CSI hsi is available, Ri first performs coher-
ent detection by multiplying ri with h∗si and then normalizes
h∗siri with a scaling factor 1|hsi|2
√
P/2
. After that, Ri transmits
the normalized h∗siri with power P/2 to destination, thus the
received signal at destination is given by
rd =
√
P
2
hid
h∗siri
|hsi|2
√
P/2
+ nd
=
√
P
2
hids+
hidh
∗
si
|hsi|2 ni + nd,
(7)
from which the capacity of AF relaying transmission from Ri
to destination is given by
CAFid = log2
(
1 +
|hsi|2|hid|2P
2(|hsi|2 + |hid|2)σ2n
)
. (8)
Meanwhile, the received signal at eavesdropper from Ri is
expressed as
re =
√
P
2
hies+
hieh
∗
si
|hsi|2 ni + ne. (9)
Similarly to Eq. (8), we obtain the capacity of AF relaying
transmission from Ri to eavesdropper as
CAFie = log2
(
1 +
|hsi|2|hie|2P
2(|hsi|2 + |hie|2)σ2n
)
. (10)
Combining Eqs. (8) and (10), we can easily obtain the secrecy
capacity of AF relaying transmission with Ri as
CAFi = C
AF
id − CAFie
= log2


1 +
|hsi|2|hid|2P
2(|hsi|2 + |hid|2)σ2n
1 +
|hsi|2|hie|2P
2(|hsi|2 + |hie|2)σ2n

 . (11)
Next, we discuss how to determine the optimal relay and
propose the AF based optimal relay selection scheme denoted
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by P-AFbORS for notational convenience. For the comparison
purpose, the traditional AF based optimal relay selection and
multiple relay combining (i.e., T-AFbORS and T-AFbMRC)
are also presented.
1) P-AFbORS: Now, let us consider the P-AFbORS scheme
in which the relay that maximizes the secrecy capacity of AF
relaying transmission is viewed as the optimal relay. Thus,
the AF based optimal relay selection criterion can be obtained
from Eq. (11) as
OptimalRelay = argmax
i∈R
CAFi
= argmax
i∈R
1 +
|hsi|2|hid|2P
2(|hsi|2 + |hid|2)σ2n
1 +
|hsi|2|hie|2P
2(|hsi|2 + |hie|2)σ2n
,
(12)
where R represents a set of M relays. One can observe
from Eq. (12) that the P-AFbORS scheme takes into account
not only the main links’ CSI |hsi|2 and |hid|2, but also the
wiretap link’s CSI |hie|2. Notice that the transmit power P
in Eq. (12) is a known parameter and the noise variance
σ2n is shown as σ2n = κTB [26], where κ is Boltzmann
constant (i.e., κ = 1.38 × 10−23), T is room temperature,
and B is system bandwidth. Since the room temperature T
and system bandwidth B both are predetermined, the noise
variance σ2n can be easily obtained. It is pointed out that using
the proposed optimal relay selection criterion in Eq. (12), we
can further develop a centralized or distributed relay selection
algorithm. To be specific, for a centralized relay selection,
the source node needs to maintain a table that consists of M
relays and related CSI (i.e., |hsi|2, |hid|2 and |hie|2). In this
way, the optimal relay can be easily determined by looking
up the table using the proposed criterion in Eq. (12), which
is referred to as centralized relay selection strategy. For a
distributed relay selection, each relay maintains a timer and
sets an initial value of the timer in inverse proportional to
[1 + |hsi|
2|hid|
2P
2(|hsi|2+|hid|2)σ2n
]/[1 + |hsi|
2|hie|
2P
2(|hsi|2+|hie|2)σ2n
], resulting in the
optimal relay with the smallest initial value for its timer. As
a consequence, the optimal relay exhausts its timer earliest
compared with the other relays, and then broadcasts a control
packet to notify the source node and other relays [21].
2) T-AFbORS: For the purpose of comparison, we here
present the traditional AF based optimal relay selection (T-
AFbORS) scheme. Since the wiretap link’s CSI |hie|2 is not
considered in T-AFbORS scheme, the relay with the largest
CAFid (i.e., the capacity of AF relaying transmission from Ri
to destination) is selected as the optimal relay. Therefore,
the traditional AF based optimal relay selection criterion is
obtained from Eq. (8) as
OptimalRelay = argmax
i∈R
CAFid
= argmax
i∈R
|hsi|2|hid|2
|hsi|2 + |hid|2 ,
(13)
which is the traditional harmonic mean policy as given by Eq.
(2) in [20]. It is shown from Eq. (13) that only the main links’
CSI |hsi|2 and |hid|2 is taken into account in the T-AFbORS
scheme, differing from the P-AFbORS scheme that requires
the CSI of both main and wiretap links (i.e., |hsi|2, |hid|2 and
|hie|2).
3) T-AFbMRC: This subsection presents the traditional AF
based multiple relay combining (T-AFbMRC) scheme, where
all AF relays participate in forwarding the source signal
transmission to destination which combines its received signals
from the multiple AF relays. Notice that in the T-AFbMRC
scheme, the total amount of transmit power consumed at
the source and M relays should be constrained to a fixed
value (i.e., P ). With the equal-power allocation, the transmit
power for each node (e.g., the source and relays) is given
by P/(M + 1). Thus, the source node first transmits the
signal s with power P/(M + 1) to M relays that will
normalize their received signals with respective scaling factors
1
|hsi|2
√
P/(M+1)
wherein i = 1, 2, · · · ,M . Then, all relays
forward their normalized signals to destination with power
P/(M + 1). Hence, the received signal at destination from
relay Ri can be expressed as
rid =
√
P
M + 1
hids+
hidh
∗
si
|hsi|2 ni + n
i
d, (14)
where ni and nid represent AWGN received at relay Ri
and destination, respectively. The destination combines its
received signals from multiple AF relays, where the combining
coefficient |hsi|2h∗id is considered for the received signal rid
from relay Ri. Accordingly, the combined signal denoted by
rd at destination is given by
rd =
M∑
i=1
√
P
M + 1
|hsi|2|hid|2s
+
M∑
i=1
(|hid|2h∗sini + |hsi|2h∗idnid),
(15)
from which the transmission capacity from source to destina-
tion via M relays with the T-AFbMRC scheme is given by
CAFbMRCsd = log2

1 +
(
M∑
i=1
|hsi|2|hid|2)2P
(M + 1)
M∑
i=1
H(hsi, hid)σ2n

 , (16)
where H(hsi, hid) = |hsi|2|hid|4 + |hsi|4|hid|2 and σ2n rep-
resents the noise variance. Also, the transmission capacity
from source to eavesdropper with the T-AFbMRC scheme is
similarly obtained as
CAFbMRCse = log2

1 +
(
M∑
i=1
|hsi|2|hie|2)2P
(M + 1)
M∑
i=1
H(hsi, hie)σ2n

 , (17)
where H(hsi, hie) = |hsi|2|hie|4 + |hsi|4|hie|2. Hence, the
secrecy capacity of T-AFbMRC scheme is shown as
CAFbMRCs = C
AFbMRC
sd − CAFbMRCse , (18)
where CAFbMRCsd and CAFbMRCse are given by Eqs. (16) and (17),
respectively.
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D. Decode-and-Forward
This subsection mainly focuses on the DF relaying protocol
in which the relay first decodes its received signal from source
and then re-encodes and transmits its decoded outcome to the
destination. More specifically, the source node first broadcasts
the signal s to M relays that attempt to decode their received
signals. Then, only the optimal relay is selected to re-encode
and transmit its decoded outcome to the destination. Similarly
to AF relaying protocol, the total transmit power at source and
relay with DF protocol is also limited to P in order to make a
fair comparison with the direct transmission. Considering the
equal-power allocation, we obtain the transmit power at source
and relay as P/2. It has been shown in [2] that the capacity of
DF relaying transmission is the minimum of the capacity from
source to relay and that from relay to destination, since either
source-relay or relay-destination links in failure will result in
the two-hop DF transmission in failure. Hence, considering
Ri as the optimal relay, we can obtain the capacity of DF
transmission from source via Ri to destination as
CDFsid = min(Csi, Cid), (19)
where Csi and Cid, respectively, represent the channel capacity
from source to Ri and that from Ri to destination, which are
given by
Csi = log2(1 +
|hsi|2P
2σ2n
), (20)
and
Cid = log2(1 +
|hid|2P
2σ2n
). (21)
Meanwhile, the eavesdropper can overhear the transmission
from Ri to destination. Hence, the channel capacity from Ri
to eavesdropper can be easily obtained as
CDFie = log2(1 +
|hie|2P
2σ2n
). (22)
Combining Eqs. (19) and (22), the secrecy capacity of DF
relaying transmission with Ri is given by
CDFi = C
DF
sid − CDFie
= log2
(
1 +
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2)P
2σ2n
)
− log2
(
1 +
|hie|2P
2σ2n
)
.
(23)
In the following subsections, we present the P-DFbORS and
T-DFbORS schemes, respectively. For the comparison pur-
pose, the traditional DF based multiple relay combining (T-
DFbMRC) scheme is also discussed.
1) P-DFbORS: Let us first consider P-DFbORS scheme.
Similarly to P-AFbORS scheme, we consider the relay that
maximizes the secrecy capacity of DF relaying transmission as
the optimal relay. Thus, the DF based optimal relay selection
criterion is easily obtained from Eq. (23) as
OptimalRelay = argmax
i∈R
CDFi
= argmax
i∈R
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2)P + 2σ2n
|hie|2P + 2σ2n
,
(24)
which shows that the global CSI of both main and wiretap
links (i.e., |hsi|2, |hid|2 and |hie|2) is required in determining
the optimal relay.
2) T-DFbORS: We now present the traditional DF based
optimal relay selection (T-DFbORS) scheme in which the relay
that maximizes the capacity of DF relaying transmission CDFsid
is selected as the optimal relay. Thus, the traditional DF based
optimal relay selection criterion is obtained from Eq. (19) as
OptimalRelay = argmax
i∈R
CDFsid
= argmax
i∈R
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2),
(25)
which is the traditional max-min relay selection criterion as
given by Eq. (1) in [20]. As shown in Eq. (25), only the main
links’ CSI |hsi|2 and |hid|2 is taken into account in T-DFbORS
scheme without considering the wiretap link’s CSI |hie|2.
3) T-DFbMRC: This subsection presents the T-DFbMRC
scheme where multiple DF relays will assist the signal trans-
mission from source to destination. To be specific, the source
node first transmits its signal s with power P/2 to M relays
which then attempt to decode their received signals. For
notational convenience, these relays that succeed in decoding
the source signal are represented by a set D, called decoding
set, where the sample space of decoding set is given by
Ω = {D|D ∈ ∅ ∪ Dm,m = 1, 2, · · · , 2M − 1}, where
∪ denotes the union operation, ∅ denotes empty set, and
Dm denotes a non-empty subcollection of M relays. If the
decoding set is empty (i.e., all relays fail to decode the source
signal), no relay will transmit and thus both the destination
and eavesdropper can not interpret the source signal. If the
decoding set D is not empty (i.e., D = Dm), all relays
in Dm are selected to forward their decoded outcomes to
destination, where the total transmit power of multiple relays
in the decoding set is constrained to P/2. With the equal-
power allocation, the transmit power for each relay in decoding
set Dm is given by P/|Dm|, where |Dm| represents the
cardinality of set Dm (i.e., the number of elements in set Dm).
Thus, considering that relay Ri ∈ Dm transmits its decoded
result s with power P/|Dm|, the received signal at destination
is given by
rid =
√
P
|Dm|hids+ n
i
d. (26)
Then, the destination combines its received signals from
multiple DF relays in decoding set Dm with the maximal
ratio combining. Thus, the combined signal denoted by rd
at destination can be written as
rd =
∑
i∈Dm
√
P
|Dm| |hid|
2s+
∑
i∈Dm
h∗idn
i
d, (27)
from which the transmission capacity from source to destina-
tion with the T-DFbMRC scheme in the case of D = Dm is
given by
CDFbMRCsd (D = Dm) = log2
(
1 +
∑
i∈Dm
|hid|2P
|Dm|σ2n
)
, (28)
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where σ2n represents the noise variance. Similarly, the trans-
mission capacity from source to eavesdropper with the T-
DFbMRC scheme can be obtained as
CDFbMRCse (D = Dm) = log2
(
1 +
∑
i∈Dm
|hie|2P
|Dm|σ2n
)
. (29)
Hence, combining Eqs. (28) and (29), the secrecy capacity of
T-DFbMRC scheme in the case of D = Dm is given by
CDFbMRCs (D = Dm) =C
DFbMRC
sd (D = Dm)
− CDFbMRCse (D = Dm) ,
(30)
which completes the signal modeling of T-DFbMRC scheme.
III. INTERCEPT PROBABILITY ANALYSIS OVER RAYLEIGH
FADING CHANNELS
In this section, we derive closed-form intercept probability
expressions of conventional direct transmission, P-AFbORS,
P-DFbORS, T-AFbORS, T-DFbORS, T-AFbMRC, and T-
DFbMRC schemes over Rayleigh fading channels.
A. Direct Transmission
Let us first analyze the intercept probability of direct trans-
mission as a baseline for comparison purpose. As is known,
an intercept event occurs when the secrecy capacity becomes
negative. Thus, the intercept probability of direct transmission
is obtained from Eq. (5) as
P directintercept = Pr
(
Cdirectsd < C
direct
se
)
= Pr
(|hsd|2 < |hse|2) , (31)
where the second equation is obtained by using Eqs. (3) and
(4). Since the Rayleigh fading model is used throughout this
paper, we can obtain that |hsd|2 and |hse|2 follow exponential
distributions. Thus, a closed-form intercept probability expres-
sion of direct transmission is given by
P directintercept =
σ2se
σ2se + σ
2
sd
, (32)
where σ2se = E(|hse|2) and σ2sd = E(|hsd|2). It is observed
from Eq. (32) that the intercept probability of direct transmis-
sion is independent of the transmit power P , which implies
that the wireless security performance cannot be improved by
increasing the transmit power. This also motivates us to exploit
cooperative relays to decrease the intercept probability and
improve the physical-layer security.
B. P-AFbORS
In this subsection, we present the intercept probability
analysis of P-AFbORS scheme. Considering the fact that an
intercept event occurs when the secrecy capacity falls below
zero, we can obtain the intercept probability of P-AFbORS
scheme from Eq. (12) as
P P-AFbORSintercept = Pr
(
max
i∈R
CAFi < 0
)
=
M∏
i=1
Pr
(|hie|2 > |hid|2),
(33)
where the second equation is obtained by using Eq. (11). Con-
sidering that |hie|2 and |hid|2 are independent exponentially
distributed random variables, we obtain
P P-AFbORSintercept =
M∏
i=1
σ2ie
σ2ie + σ
2
id
, (34)
where σ2ie = E(|hie|2) and σ2id = E(|hid|2).
C. P-DFbORS
This subsection derives a closed-form intercept probability
expression of P-DFbORS scheme. According to the definition
of intercept event, an intercept probability of P-DFbORS
scheme is obtained from Eq. (24) as
P P-DFbORSintercept = Pr
(
max
i∈R
CDFi < 0
)
=
M∏
i=1
Pr
{
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2) < |hie|2
}
,
(35)
where the second equation is obtained by using Eq. (23).
Notice that random variables |hsi|2, |hid|2 and |hie|2 follow
exponential distributions with means σ2si, σ2id and σ2ie, respec-
tively. Denoting X = min(|hsi|2, |hid|2), we can easily obtain
the cumulative density function (CDF) of X as
PX(X < x) = 1− exp(− x
σ2si
− x
σ2id
), (36)
wherein x ≥ 0. Using Eq. (36), we have
Pr
{
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2) < |hie|2
}
=
∫ ∞
0
[1− exp(− x
σ2si
− x
σ2id
)]
1
σ2ie
exp(− x
σ2ie
)dx
=
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
id
.
(37)
Substituting Eq. (37) into Eq. (35) gives
P P-DFbORSintercept =
M∏
i=1
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
id
. (38)
In addition, we can easily prove σ
2
ie
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
<
σ2
id
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
σ2
ie
σ2
id
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
σ2
id
. Considering σ
2
ie
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
> 0 and
σ2
id
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
σ2
ie
σ2
id
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
σ2
ie
+σ2
si
σ2
id
> 0, we obtain
M∏
i=1
σ2ie
σ2ie + σ
2
si
<
M∏
i=1
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie
σ2idσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
ie + σ
2
siσ
2
id
, (39)
which theoretically shows that the intercept probability of
P-AFbORS scheme is strictly less than that of P-DFbORS
scheme, implying the advantage of AF relaying protocol over
DF protocol from the physical-layer security perspective.
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D. T-AFbORS
In this subsection, we present the intercept probability
analysis of T-AFbORS scheme. From Eq. (13), we obtain an
intercept probability of T-AFbORS scheme as
P T-AFbORSintercept = Pr
(
max
i∈R
CAFid < C
AF
oe
)
, (40)
where CAFoe denotes the channel capacity from the optimal
relay to eavesdropper. It is pointed out that the T-AFbORS
scheme does not consider the eavesdropper’s CSI |hie|2. This
means that the traditional relay selection is independent of
the eavesdropper’s channel information. Using the law of total
probability, the intercept probability of T-AFbORS scheme is
given by
P T-AFbORSintercept =
M∑
m=1
Pr (OptimalRelay = m)
× Pr
(
max
i∈R
CAFid < C
AF
me
)
.
(41)
For simplicity, we here consider that fading coefficients hsi
and hid (i = 1, · · · ,M) are identically and independently
distributed, leading to Pr (OptimalRelay = m) = 1/M . Sub-
stituting this result and Eq. (13) into Eq. (41) yields
P T-AFbORSintercept =
M∑
m=1
1
M
Pr


max
i∈R
|hsi|2|hid|2
|hsi|2 + |hid|2
<
|hsm|2|hme|2
|hsm|2 + |hme|2

. (42)
It is noted that obtaining a closed-form solution to Eq. (42) is
challenging, however numerical intercept probability results of
T-AFbORS scheme can be easily obtained through computer
simulations.
E. T-DFbORS
This subsection analyzes the intercept probability of T-
DFbORS scheme in Rayleigh fading channels. From Eq. (25),
we obtain an intercept probability of T-DFbORS scheme as
P T-DFbORSintercept = Pr
(
max
i∈R
CDFsid < C
DF
oe
)
, (43)
where CDFoe denotes the channel capacity from the optimal
relay to eavesdropper with DF relaying protocol. Similarly,
assuming that hsi and hid (i = 1, · · · ,M) are identically
and independently distributed and using the law of total
probability, the intercept probability of T-DFbORS scheme is
given by
P T-DFbORSintercept =
M∑
m=1
1
M
Pr
(
max
i∈R
min
(|hsi|2, |hid|2)
< |hme|2
)
. (44)
Notice that |hsi|2, |hid|2 and |hme|2 follow exponential dis-
tributions with means σ2si, σ2id and σ2me, respectively. Letting
x = |hme|2, we obtain Eq. (45) at the top of following page,
where the second equation is obtained by using the binomial
expansion, Ak represents the k-th non-empty sub-collection
of M relays, and |Ak| represents the number of elements in
set Ak.
F. T-AFbMRC
This subsection presents the intercept probability analysis of
T-AFbMRC scheme. From Eq. (18), an intercept probability
of the T-AFbMRC scheme is obtained as
P T-AFbMRCintercept = Pr
(
CAFbMRCsd < C
AFbMRC
se
)
. (46)
Substituting Eqs. (16) and (17) into Eq. (46) gives
P T-AFbMRCintercept = Pr


(
M∑
i=1
|hsi|2|hid|2)2
M∑
i=1
H(hsi, hid)
<
(
M∑
i=1
|hsi|2|hie|2)2
M∑
i=1
H(hsi, hie)


, (47)
where H(hsi, hid) = |hsi|2|hid|4 + |hsi|4|hid|2 and
H(hsi, hie) = |hsi|2|hie|4 + |hsi|4|hie|2. From Eq. (47), the
numerical intercept probability results of T-AFbMRC scheme
can be easily determined through computer simulations.
G. T-DFbMRC
In this subsection, the intercept probability analysis of T-
DFbMRC scheme is presented. Using the law of total proba-
bility, we can obtain an intercept probability of the T-DFbMRC
scheme from Eq. (30) as
P T-DFbMRCintercept =
2M−1∑
m=1
Pr (D = Dm)
× Pr (CDFbMRCs (D = Dm) < 0),
(48)
where Pr (D = Dm) represents the probability of occurrence
of event D = Dm. Notice that if the decoding set is empty, all
relays keep silent and nothing is transmitted, implying that the
eavesdropper can not intercept the source signal. Substituting
Eqs. (28) and (29) into Eq. (48) yields
P T-DFbMRCintercept =
2M−1∑
m=1
Pr (D = Dm)
× Pr
( ∑
i∈Dm
|hid|2 <
∑
i∈Dm
|hie|2
)
.
(49)
According to Shannon’s channel coding theorem, relay Ri can
succeed in decoding the source signal if no outage event occurs
over the channel from source to relay Ri. Otherwise, relay
Ri is deemed to fail to decode the source signal. Thus, the
probability of occurrence of event D = Dm can be given by
Pr (D = Dm) =
∏
i∈Dm
(1 − Pouti)
∏
i∈D¯m
Pouti, (50)
where D¯m = R − Dm represents the complementary set of
Dm and Pouti represents the probability of occurrence of
outage event over the channel from source to relay Ri. So
far, we have completed the intercept probability analysis of
direct transmission, P-AFbORS, P-DFbORS, T-AFbORS, T-
DFbORS, T-AFbMRC, and T-DFbMRC schemes.
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P T-DFbORSintercept =
M∑
m=1
1
M
∫ ∞
0
M∏
i=1
[1− exp(− x
σ2si
− x
σ2id
)]
1
σ2me
exp(− x
σ2me
)dx
=
M∑
m=1
1
M
∫ ∞
0

1 + 2
M−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak| exp[−
∑
i∈Ak
(
x
σ2si
+
x
σ2id
)]

 1
σ2me
exp(− x
σ2me
)dx
=
M∑
m=1
1
M

1 + 2
M−1∑
k=1
(−1)|Ak|[1 +
∑
i∈Ak
(
σ2me
σ2si
+
σ2me
σ2id
)]−1


(45)
IV. DIVERSITY ORDER ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the diversity order performance
of the traditional and proposed optimal relay selection schemes
including the T-AFbORS, T-DFbORS, P-AFbORS, and P-
DFbORS. Let us first recall the traditional definition of di-
versity gain. As shown in [27], the traditional diversity gain
is given by
d = − lim
SNR→∞
logPe(SNR)
log SNR , (51)
where SNR denotes signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and Pe(SNR)
denotes bit error rate. One can observe from the preceding
equation that the traditional diversity gain is defined as SNR →
∞. However, the intercept probability expressions as shown
in Eqs. (32), (34) and (38) are independent of SNR, resulting
in that the traditional diversity gain definition is not applicable
here. To that end, we propose a generalized diversity gain as
follows
dgeneralized = − lim
λde→∞
log(Pintercept)
log(λde)
, (52)
where λde = σ2sd/σ2se is the ratio of average channel gain
from source to destination to that from source to eavesdropper,
which is referred to as the main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER)
throughout this paper.
A. Direct Transmission
Let us first analyze the diversity order of direct transmission
as a baseline. From Eqs. (32) and (52), the diversity order of
direct transmission is obtained as
ddirect = − lim
λde→∞
log(P directintercept)
log(λde)
= 1, (53)
which shows that the direct transmission achieves the diversity
order of only one, i.e., the intercept probability of direct trans-
mission scheme behaves as 1λde in high main-to-eavesdropper
ratio (MER) regions.
B. P-AFbORS
This subsection presents the diversity order analysis of P-
AFbORS scheme. Similarly, the diversity order of P-AFbORS
scheme is given by
dP-AFbORS = − lim
λde→∞
log(P P-AFbORSintercept )
log(λde)
, (54)
where P P-AFbORSintercept is given in Eq. (34). Denoting σ2id = αidσ2sd
and σ2ie = αieσ2se, we can rewrite P P-AFbORSintercept from Eq. (34) as
P P-AFbORSintercept =
M∏
i=1
αie
αieλ
−1
de + αid
· ( 1
λde
)M , (55)
where λde = σ2sd/σ2se. Substituting Eq. (55) into Eq. (54) gives
dP-AFbORS = M, (56)
which shows that the diversity order M is achieved by P-
AFbORS scheme. One can see that as the number of relays M
increases, the diversity order of P-AFbORS scheme increases
accordingly, showing that increasing the number of relays can
significantly improve the intercept probability performance.
C. P-DFbORS
In this subsection, we focus on the diversity order analysis
of P-DFbORS scheme. Similarly to Eq. (54), the diversity
order of P-DFbORS scheme is given by
dP-DFbORS = − lim
λde→∞
log(P P-DFbORSintercept )
log(λde)
, (57)
where P P-DFbORSintercept is given in Eq. (38). Denoting σ2id = αidσ2sd,
σ2ie = αieσ
2
se and σ2si = αsiσ2sd, we can rewrite P P-DFbORSintercept
from Eq. (38) as
P P-DFbORSintercept =
M∏
i=1
αid + αsi
αidλ
−1
de + αsiλ
−1
de + αsiαidα
−1
ie
× ( 1
λde
)M ,
(58)
where λde = σ2sd/σ2se. Substituting Eq. (58) into Eq. (57)
yields
dP-DFbORS = M. (59)
It is shown from Eq. (59) that the P-DFbORS scheme achieves
the diversity order M , i.e., the intercept probability of P-
DFbORS scheme behaves as ( 1λde )
M for λde →∞.
D. T-AFbORS
We now examine the diversity order of T-AFbORS scheme.
The diversity order of T-AFbORS scheme is given by
dT-AFbORS = − lim
λde→∞
log(P T-AFbORSintercept )
log(λde)
, (60)
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P T-AFbORSintercept =
M∑
m=1
1
M
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
M∏
i=1,i6=m
Pr
( |hsi|2|hid|2
|hsi|2 + |hid|2 <
xy
x+ y
)
Pr
(|hmd|2 < y) f(x, y)dxdy (61)
where P T-AFbORSintercept is given in Eq. (42). Denoting X = |hsm|2
and Y = |hme|2 and using the conditional probability, we
obtain Eq. (61), where f(x, y) represents a joint probability
density function (PDF) of (X,Y ). Considering that X and
Y are independent exponentially distributed, the joint PDF
f(x, y) is given by
f(x, y) =
1
σ2smσ
2
me
exp(− x
σ2sm
− y
σ2me
), (62)
where σ2sm = E(|hsm|2) and σ2me = E(|hme|2). Using
inequalities 1|hsi|2 +
1
|hid|2
≥ max( 1|hsi|2 , 1|hid|2 ) and 1x + 1y ≤
2max( 1x ,
1
y ), we obtain
Pr
( |hsi|2|hid|2
|hsi|2 + |hid|2 <
xy
x+ y
)
= Pr
(
1
|hsi|2 +
1
|hid|2 >
1
x
+
1
y
)
≥ Pr
(
max(
1
|hsi|2 ,
1
|hid|2 ) > 2max(
1
x
,
1
y
)
)
= Pr
(
min(|hsi|2, |hid|2) < 1
2
min(x, y)
)
= 1− exp[(− 1
2σ2si
− 1
2σ2id
)min(x, y)].
(63)
Substituting Pr
(
|hsi|
2|hid|
2
|hsi|2+|hid|2
< xyx+y
)
≥ 1 − exp[(− 1
2σ2
si
−
1
2σ2
id
)min(x, y)] from Eq. (63) into Eq. (61), we can obtain a
lower bound on the intercept probability of T-AFbORS scheme
as
P T-AFbORSintercept ≥
M∑
m=1
1
M
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
M∏
i=1,i6=m
gi(x, y)
× [1− exp(− y
σ2md
)]f(x, y)dxdy,
(64)
where gi(x, y) = 1 − exp[(− 12σ2
si
− 1
2σ2
id
)min(x, y)] and
f(x, y) is given by Eq. (62). Proposition 1: Given independent
exponential random variables x and y with respective means
σ2sm and σ2me, the following equations hold,
1−exp[(− 1
2σ2si
− 1
2σ2id
)min(x, y)] = (
1
2σ2si
+
1
2σ2id
)min(x, y),
and
1− exp(− y
σ2md
) =
y
σ2md
,
for λde →∞, where λde = σ2sd/σ2se.
Proof: See Appendix A for details.
Using Proposition 1 and denoting σ2si = αsiσ2sd, σ2id = αidσ2sd,
σ2sm = αsmσ
2
sd, σ
2
md = αmdσ
2
sd and σ2me = αmeσ2se, we
obtain from Eq. (64) as Eq. (65) with λde →∞ at the top of
following page. Ignoring the higher-order terms in Eq. (65),
we have
P T-AFbORSintercept ≥
M∑
m=1
1
M
M∏
i=1,i6=m
(
1
2αsi
+
1
2αid
)
M !αMme
αmd
× ( 1
λde
)M ,
(66)
Substituting Eq. (66) into Eq. (60) gives
dT-AFbORS ≤M. (67)
In addition, considering inequalities 1|hsi|2 +
1
|hid|2
≤
2max( 1|hsi|2 ,
1
|hid|2
) and 1x +
1
y ≥ max( 1x , 1y ), we obtain an
upper bound on the intercept probability of T-AFbORS scheme
as
P T-AFbORSintercept ≤
M∑
m=1
1
M
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
M∏
i=1,i6=m
hi(x, y)
× [1− exp(− y
σ2md
)]f(x, y)dxdy,
(68)
where hi(x, y) = 1− exp[(− 2σ2
si
− 2
σ2
id
)min(x, y)]. Similarly
to Eq. (66), we can obtain
P T-AFbORSintercept ≤
M∑
m=1
1
M
M∏
i=1,i6=m
(
2
αsi
+
2
αid
)
M !αMme
αmd
× ( 1
λde
)M ,
(69)
for λde →∞. Substituting Eq. (69) into Eq. (60) gives
dT-AFbORS ≥M. (70)
Therefore, by combining Eqs. (67) and (70), the diversity order
of T-AFbORS scheme is readily obtained as
dT-AFbORS = M, (71)
which shows that the diversity order M is achieved by T-
AFbORS scheme.
E. T-DFbORS
In this subsection, we present the diversity order analysis of
T-DFbORS scheme. Using Eq. (52), we obtain the diversity
order of T-DFbORS scheme as
dT-DFbORS = − lim
λde→∞
log(P T-DFbORSintercept )
log(λde)
, (72)
where P T-DFbORSintercept is given in Eq. (45). From Proposition 1, we
can similarly obtain 1 − exp(− x
σ2
si
− x
σ2
id
) = x
σ2
si
+ x
σ2
id
for
λde → ∞ by using the Taylor series expansion and ignoring
higher-order terms, from which P T-DFbORSintercept can be obtained as
P T-DFbORSintercept =
M∑
m=1
(M − 1)!
M∏
i=1
(
αme
αsi
+
αme
αid
)
× ( 1
λde
)M ,
(73)
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P T-AFbORSintercept ≥
M∑
m=1
1
M
M∏
i=1,i6=m
(
1
2σ2si
+
1
2σ2id
)
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
[min(x, y)]M−1y
σ2smσ
2
mdσ
2
me
exp(− x
σ2sm
− y
σ2me
)dxdy
=
M∑
m=1
1
M
M∏
i=1,i6=m
(
1
2σ2si
+
1
2σ2id
)
1
σ2md
∫ ∞
0
xM−1
σ2sm
exp(− x
σ2sm
)dx
∫ ∞
x
y
σ2me
exp(− y
σ2me
)dy
+
M∑
m=1
1
M
M∏
i=1,i6=m
(
1
2σ2si
+
1
2σ2id
)
1
σ2md
∫ ∞
0
yM
σ2me
exp(− y
σ2me
)dy
∫ ∞
y
1
σ2sm
exp(− x
σ2sm
)dx
=
M∑
m=1
1
M
M∏
i=1,i6=m
(
M + 1
2αsi
+
M + 1
2αid
)
(M − 1)!αM+1me
αsmαmd
· ( 1
λde
)M+1
+
M∑
m=1
1
M
M∏
i=1,i6=m
(
1
2αsi
+
1
2αid
)
M !αMme
αmd
· ( 1
λde
)M
(65)
where αsi = σ2si/σ2sd, αid = σ2id/σ2sd, and αme = σ2me/σ2se.
Substituting Eq. (73) into Eq. (72) yields
dT-DFbORS = M, (74)
which shows that the T-DFbORS scheme also achieves the
diversity order M . As shown in Eqs. (56), (59), (71) and
(74), the P-AFbORS, P-DFbORS, T-AFbORS and T-DFbORS
schemes all achieve the same diversity order M . This implies
that in high MER regions, the intercept probabilities of P-
AFbORS, P-DFbORS, T-AFbORS and T-DFbORS schemes all
behave as (1/λde)M for λde →∞. Therefore, for M > 1, the
intercept probabilities of P-AFbORS, P-DFbORS, T-AFbORS
and T-DFbORS schemes are reduced much faster than that of
direct transmission as λde → ∞, showing the physical-layer
security benefit of using the optimal relay selection.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
This section presents the numerical intercept probabil-
ity results of conventional direct transmission, T-AFbORS,
T-DFbORS, T-AFbMRC, T-DFbMRC, P-AFbORS and P-
DFbORS schemes. We show that for both AF and DF pro-
tocols, the proposed optimal relay selection outperforms the
traditional relay selection and multiple relay combining ap-
proaches in terms of intercept probability. Moreover, numerical
results also illustrate that as the number of relays increases, the
intercept probabilities of P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS schemes
significantly decrease, showing the security improvement by
exploiting cooperative relays.
Fig. 2 shows the intercept probability comparison among the
direct transmission, P-AFbORS, T-AFbORS, and T-AFbMRC
schemes by plotting Eqs. (32), (34), (42) and (47) as a function
of MER. It is shown from Fig. 2 that the T-AFbORS, T-
AFbMRC, and P-AFbORS schemes all perform better than the
direct transmission in terms of intercept probability, implying
the security benefits of exploiting cooperative relays to defend
against eavesdropping attack. One can also see from Fig. 2 that
the intercept probability performance of T-AFbMRC scheme
is worse than that of T-AFbORC scheme which performs
worse than the P-AFbMRC scheme, showing the advantage
−5 0 5 10 15
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
MER (dB)
In
te
rc
ep
t P
ro
ba
bi
lity
 
 
Direct transmission
T−AFbMRC scheme
T−AFbORS scheme
P−AFbORS scheme
Fig. 2. Intercept probability versus main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) of the
direct transmission, T-AFbORS, T-AFbMRC, and P-AFbORS schemes with
αsi = αid = αie = 1.
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Fig. 3. Intercept probability versus main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) of the
direct transmission, T-DFbORS, T-DFbMRC, and P-DFbORS schemes with
Pouti = 10
−3 and αsi = αid = αie = 1.
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Fig. 4. Intercept probability versus main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER) of the
direct transmission, P-AFbORS, and P-DFbORS schemes with αsi = αid =
αie = 1.
of proposed optimal relay selection over both the traditional
relay selection and multiple relay combining approaches.
In Fig. 3, we show the numerical intercept probability re-
sults of various DF based optimal relay selection and multiple
relay combining schemes, in which the intercept probability
curves of direct transmission, P-DFbORS, T-DFbORS, and T-
DFbMRC schemes are plotted by using Eqs. (32), (38), (45),
and (49) with Pouti = 10−3 and αsi = αid = αie = 1.
Fig. 3 shows that the intercept probability of P-DFbORS
scheme is always smaller than that of T-DFbMRC scheme
which further outperforms the T-DFbORS scheme in terms of
intercept probability. In other words, the P-DFbORS scheme
achieves the best intercept probability performance, further
confirming the advantage of proposed optimal relay selection
over traditional relay selection and multiple relay combining.
Therefore, no matter which relaying protocol (i.e., AF and
DF) is considered, the proposed optimal relay selection always
performs better than the traditional relay selection and multiple
relay combining approaches in terms of intercept probability.
Fig. 4 depicts the intercept probability comparison between
the P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS schemes with αsi = αid =
αie = 1. One can see from Fig. 4 that for the cases of
M = 2, M = 4, and M = 8, the direct transmission
strictly performs worse than the P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS
schemes in terms of intercept probability. Moreover, as the
number of relays M increases from M = 2 to M = 8, the
intercept probabilities of P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS schemes
both decrease significantly. This means that increasing the
number of cooperative relays can enhance the physical-layer
security against eavesdropping attack. In addition, Fig. 4 also
shows that for the cases of M = 2, M = 4, and M = 8,
the P-AFbORS scheme always outperforms the P-DFbORS
scheme, showing the advantage of AF relaying protocol over
DF protocol.
Fig. 5 shows the intercept probability versus the number
of relays M of the P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS schemes with
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Fig. 5. Intercept probability versus the number of relays M of the P-AFbORS
and P-DFbORS schemes with λde = 3dB and αsi = αid = αie = 1.
λde = 3dB and αsi = αid = αie = 1. It is observed from
Fig. 5 that the P-AFbORS scheme strictly performs better the
P-DFbORS scheme in terms of intercept probability. One can
also see from Fig. 5 that as the number of relays M increases,
the intercept probabilities of both P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS
schemes significantly decrease, showing the wireless security
improvement with an increasing number of relays. In addition,
as shown in Fig. 5, the intercept probability improvement of
P-AFbORS over P-DFbORS becomes more significant as the
number of relays increases.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored the relay selection for improv-
ing physical-layer security in cooperative wireless networks
and proposed the AF and DF based optimal relay selection
schemes, i.e., P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS. For the purpose
of comparison, we also examined the conventional direct
transmission, T-AFbORS, T-DFbORS, T-AFbMRC, and T-
DFbMRC schemes. We derived closed-form intercept prob-
ability expressions of the direct transmission, T-AFbORS,
T-DFbORS, T-AFbMRC, T-DFbMRC, P-AFbORS and P-
DFbORS schemes over Rayleigh fading channels. We further
analyzed the diversity order performance of the traditional and
proposed optimal relay selection schemes and showed that for
both AF and DF protocols, the proposed and traditional relay
selection schemes achieve the diversity order M , where M
is the number of cooperative relays. Numerical results also
illustrated that no matter which relaying protocol is considered
(i.e., AF and DF), the proposed optimal relay selection strictly
outperforms the traditional relay selection and multiple relay
combining approaches in terms of intercept probability. In
addition, as the number of relays increases, the intercept
probability performance of both P-AFbORS and P-DFbORS
significantly improves, implying the wireless security enhance-
ment with an increasing number of cooperative relays.
It is worth mentioning that we only investigated the single-
source and single-destination for cooperative relay networks
in this paper. In future, we will extend the results of this
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paper to a general case with multiple-source and multiple-
destination, for which the opportunistic transmission schedul-
ing may be exploited to defend against eavesdropping attack.
More specifically, a source node with the highest secrecy
capacity can be opportunistically scheduled to transmit to its
destination. Once a source-destination pair is determined with
the transmission scheduling policy, we can consider the use
of optimal relay selection developed in this paper to assist
the transmission between source and destination against the
eavesdropping attack.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Denoting z = ( 1
2σ2
si
+ 1
2σ2
id
)min(x, y) and using the joint
PDF of (X,Y ) in Eq. (62), we can obtain the mean of z as
E(z) = (
1
2αsi
+
1
2αid
)
αsmα
2
me
(αsm + αmeλ
−1
de )
2 ·
1
λ2de
+ (
1
2αsi
+
1
2αid
)
α2smαme
(αsm + αmeλ
−1
de )
2 ·
1
λde
,
(A.1)
where αsi = σ2si/σ2sd, αid = σ2id/σ2sd, αsm = σ2sm/σ2sd, and
αme = σ
2
me/σ
2
se. Considering λde → ∞ and ignoring the
higher-order term, we have
E(z) = (
αme
2αsi
+
αme
2αid
) · 1
λde
, (A.2)
which shows that E(z) converges to zero as λde → ∞.
Moreover, using Eq. (62) and letting λde →∞, we can obtain
E(z2) as
E(z2) = (
αme
2αsi
+
αme
2αsi
)2 · 2
λ2de
, (A.3)
where the third equation is obtained by ignoring higher-order
terms. From Eqs. (A.2) and (A.3), the variance of z is given
by
V ar(z) = E(z2)− [E(z)]2 = (αme
2αsi
+
αme
2αsi
)2 · 1
λ2de
, (A.4)
for λde → ∞. It is shown from Eqs. (A.2) and (A.4) that
both mean and variance of z approach to zero as λde → ∞,
implying that z → 0 as λde → ∞. Thus, considering λde →
∞ and using Taylor series expansion, we obtain
1− exp(−z) = z +O(z), (A.5)
where O(z) represents higher-order infinitesimal. Substituting
z = ( 1
2σ2
si
+ 1
2σ2
id
)min(x, y) into Eq. (A.5) and ignoring
higher-order infinitesimal, we have
1− exp[(− 1
2σ2si
− 1
2σ2id
)min(x, y)]
= (
1
2σ2si
+
1
2σ2id
)min(x, y).
(A.6)
In addition, denoting t = y
σ2
md
, we can easily obtain both mean
and variance of t as
E(t) =
∫ ∞
0
y
σ2mdσ
2
me
exp(− y
σ2me
)dy =
αme
αmd
· 1
λde
, (A.7)
and
V ar(t) = E(t2)− [E(t)]2 = α
2
me
α2md
· 1
λ2de
. (A.8)
One can observe from Eqs. (A.7) and (A.8) that both mean
and variance of t approach to zero as λde →∞, meaning that
t → 0 as λde → ∞. Hence, considering λde → ∞ and using
Taylor series expansion, we obtain
1− exp(−t) = t+O(t). (A.9)
Substituting t = y
σ2
md
into Eq. (A.9) and ignoring the higher-
order infinitesimal yield
1− exp(− y
σ2md
) =
y
σ2md
, (A.10)
which completes the proof of Proposition 1.
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